How the US Could Forcibly Reopen the Strait of Hormuz — and Why It's So Hard

The Problem: 21 Miles of Iranian Leverage

The Strait of Hormuz is 21 nautical miles (34 kilometers) wide at its narrowest point, according to Wikipedia's documentation of the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis. Commercial shipping transits through two 2-mile-wide lanes separated by a 2-mile median, according to House of Saud analysis. The entire northern coastline belongs to Iran — mountainous terrain that provides natural cover for shore-based weapons. The water at the strait's narrowest point is only about 200 feet deep, shallow enough to lay naval minefields, according to the New York Times.

Since the war began on February 28, Iran has attacked more than 21 confirmed merchant ships in or near the strait, according to Wikipedia's 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis article. Tanker traffic initially dropped approximately 70%, with over 150 ships anchoring outside the strait to avoid risk. Traffic subsequently dropped to near zero, according to Wikipedia. This disruption affects approximately 20% of the world's daily oil supply and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas, according to multiple sources including Wikipedia and NBC News.

On March 27, Iran's IRGC announced that the strait is closed to any vessel traveling "to and from" the ports of the United States, Israel, and their allies, according to AFP as cited by Wikipedia.

On March 30, Trump posted on Truth Social threatening to "blow up and completely obliterate all of their Electric Generating Plants, Oil Wells and Kharg Island (and possibly all desalinization plants!)" if a deal is not "shortly reached," according to The Independent. He added that this infrastructure had been "purposefully not yet 'touched.'"

Option 1: Massive Naval Presence and Convoy Escorts

The naval escort route has historical precedent. Operation Earnest Will (July 1987 – September 1988) was the largest U.S. naval convoy operation since World War II, according to Britannica, during which the U.S. escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. The first convoy departed the UAE on July 22, 1987, protected by five U.S. ships — a destroyer, two frigates, and two Coast Guard cutters — according to CNN's historical coverage.

However, analysts note that a 2026 version of Earnest Will would face challenges the 1987 operation did not. Iran's drone and missile capabilities — though degraded by six weeks of U.S.-Israeli strikes — significantly exceed what Iran possessed in the 1980s. The U.S. Navy's fleet is approximately half the size it was during the Cold War, according to the Middle East Forum.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted that even during Earnest Will, Iran did not simply stop: "Instead, it designed workarounds, ceasing small boat attacks on tankers but challenging the United States by covertly sowing minefields, attacking tankers in port once they were no longer under escort, and ramping up attacks on vessels not protected by the convoys. Indeed, an oil tanker struck a mine in the very first convoy." Iran did not fully pull back until after April 1988 following a series of U.S. retaliatory strikes, according to the Washington Institute.

Naval expert Jennifer Parker, who served 20 years with the Royal Australian Navy, explained to The Conversation that getting ships back through the strait requires two sequential phases. The first phase is reducing Iran's ability to attack — by destroying radar facilities, command and control structures, and weapons bunkers along the coast. The U.S. has air power and intelligence capabilities to identify and destroy most such targets, Parker said, but locating and destroying Iran's drones is harder because they can be stored almost anywhere.

The second phase, Parker told The Conversation, requires sustained airborne early warning and maritime patrol aircraft monitoring the strait and surrounding waters, combat air patrols by fighter aircraft above the strait, helicopters ready to respond to attacks, and warships providing occasional escorts. This is a continuous, resource-intensive commitment, not a one-time operation.

The Washington Institute separately noted that U.S. forces had already destroyed over 130 Iranian naval vessels and 44 minelayers, and attacked dozens of military targets along Iran's coast and inside the Gulf, including mine and missile storage sites, as of late March — a significant degradation of Iranian capabilities, though not their elimination.

Option 2: Island Seizure — Kharg and the Gulf Islands

The ground operation option centers on seizing one or more Iranian islands in the Gulf. Kharg Island, Iran's main oil export terminal handling more than 90% of its crude exports, is the most-discussed target, according to NBC News. U.S. Central Command has already struck more than 90 military targets on Kharg, including air defenses and naval facilities.

Trump told the Financial Times on March 30: "Maybe we take Kharg Island, maybe we don't. We have a lot of options. It would also mean we had to be there [in Kharg Island] for a while."

Half of a contingent of 5,000 marines specialized in amphibious landings arrived in the Middle East on March 29 via the USS Tripoli, according to The Guardian. About 2,000 paratroopers were also due to arrive, according to The Guardian. U.S. media reported a third aircraft carrier heading to the region and the administration considering dispatching another 10,000 soldiers, also according to The Guardian.

However, the current force size is a fraction of what large-scale land operations would require. About 150,000 troops were deployed in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and Iran's territory is more than three times the size of Iraq, according to The Guardian. Kharg Island is also deep inside the Gulf — well past the Strait of Hormuz — adding logistical difficulty and vulnerability once forces are ashore, according to The Guardian.

Emma Salisbury, a senior fellow in the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told The Guardian that she believed Trump would not be able to resist escalating the conflict by capturing an Iranian island. "At every point so far he's gone for it, and I can't see this being any different. He will use the soldiers if they're available," she said, adding: "I think that will go horribly wrong and there will be a lot of casualties."

Iran's parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on March 29: "Our men are waiting for the arrival of the American soldiers on the ground to set them on fire and punish their regional allies once and for all," according to The Guardian. Iran has also sent warnings through mediators that it is prepared to carpet bomb its own territory to kill invading forces and blow up its own infrastructure to hit U.S. soldiers, according to diplomats cited by The Guardian.

The Mine Problem: 5,000 Weapons, Weeks of Clearance

Mines present a distinct challenge from missiles and drones — one that ground operations and airstrikes cannot easily solve. Iran has more than 5,000 naval mines in its arsenal, according to estimates by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, cited by the New York Times. Iran has been deploying them into the strait, U.S. officials confirmed to the Times.

Mine types include moored mines — warheads held just below the surface by chains — and "bottom mines," which lie on the seafloor and use magnetic, acoustic, pressure, and seismic sensors to detonate when a ship passes, according to the New York Times. The water depth of roughly 200 feet at the strait's narrowest makes bottom mines deployable across the transit lanes.

Military officials told the New York Times that a U.S. mine-clearing operation in the Strait of Hormuz would likely take weeks and would be both hugely expensive and dangerous. If mines are confirmed or even suspected in the strait, the entire transit reassurance campaign is complicated, Jennifer Parker told The Conversation, requiring extensive and time-consuming mine clearance before escorts can safely proceed.

Mining also carries costs for Iran: mines in the strait could prevent Iranian oil from exiting the Gulf, limiting the revenues Tehran needs to sustain its war effort, the New York Times noted. This creates a degree of deterrence — but Iran's willingness to inflict costs on itself, including the threat to bomb its own territory to kill U.S. forces, suggests it is willing to accept severe economic damage in the short term.

The Coalition Dimension

The U.S. has not acted alone diplomatically. On March 19, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement expressing "readiness to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage" through the Strait of Hormuz, according to a UK government statement cited by the Washington Institute. Twenty-two nations had signed the statement as of late March, according to the Wall Street Journal as cited by the Washington Institute.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated on March 12 that the U.S. Navy may be able to start escorting ships through the strait by the end of March, according to Wikipedia's Hormuz crisis article, while noting the military remained focused on "destroying Iran's offensive capabilities and the manufacturing industry that supplies their offensive capabilities."

As of March 30, that end-of-March deadline has arrived without a publicly announced naval escort operation. Whether this reflects diplomatic progress, ongoing military preparation, or mission delay was not confirmed by public sources as of the time of writing.

Iran's Counter-Leverage

Iran has established what the Washington Institute describes as a "selective passage regime" — exporting its own oil and gas while permitting safe passage to countries that pay a form of tribute and denying transit to others. Tehran's stated terms to end the war include a "new legal regime for the Strait of Hormuz," according to Tasnim News Agency as cited by the Washington Institute — a demand that would institutionalize Iranian veto power over global shipping.

Iran sent a letter to International Maritime Organization member states on March 22 stating that "non-hostile" ships could pass through the Strait of Hormuz if they coordinate with Iran first. Ships associated with the U.S., Israel, or "participants in the aggression" are excluded from safe passage, according to ISW's March 25 Special Report. Vessel operators are required to contact intermediaries with connections to the IRGC before transiting.

This selective regime serves Iran's economic interests while maintaining military pressure. It also creates a diplomatic tool: countries can individually negotiate passage for their ships, potentially fracturing the coalition aligned against Iran and generating revenue for Tehran during the war. Whether any countries have accepted this arrangement was not confirmed in available public sources as of March 30, 2026.