On Saturday, April 5, Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the military command overseeing the country's war effort, issued a statement carried by the semi-official Tasnim news agency: Iraq is exempt from all restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz. "We hold profound respect for Iraq's national sovereignty," the statement read. "You are a nation that bears the scars of American occupation, and your struggle against the US is worthy of praise and admiration." At the same time, Iran's Fars News Agency reported that 15 ships had passed through the strait in the preceding 24 hours with Tehran's explicit permission. And according to shipping data tracked by Lloyd's List Intelligence, the week ending April 5 saw 53 transits through the strait — the highest weekly total since the war began on February 28, up from 36 the week before.
None of this constitutes an opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Traffic is still down more than 90 percent from pre-war levels. But it does constitute something more strategically interesting than a simple blockade: a selective-access system in which Iran decides, ship by ship and nation by nation, who gets through and who does not — while publicly telling the United States that there are no negotiations, no deal in progress, and no intention of reopening the waterway on Trump's terms.
How the Tollbooth System Actually Works
Iran began developing what analysts and shipping journals have called a "tollbooth" model in the first weeks of the war. Rather than physically blocking all transit — which would require constant naval engagement and risk direct confrontation with US warships — Tehran implemented a permission-based system operated by the IRGC's Navy (NEDSA). Vessels seeking to pass must apply for approval through a process involving Iranian authorities. Some pay a fee, reported by some outlets at up to $2 million per ship. Others receive approval based on the nationality of the vessel or cargo owner.
The Iraq exemption announced Saturday is the clearest articulation yet of the political logic underlying this system. Iran is using Hormuz access as a foreign policy instrument. Iraq — a neighbor with deep Shia political ties to Tehran, a country whose parliament has repeatedly called for the expulsion of US forces, and a nation whose oil revenue has been devastated by the closure — is rewarded. Countries that Iran considers enemies, or those allied with US military operations, are not.
According to Al Jazeera's reporting on the Lloyd's List data, a French container ship and a Japanese-owned tanker crossed the strait in the days preceding Saturday — the first apparent transits linked to either country since the start of the conflict. France and Japan are not parties to the war and have maintained diplomatic caution. Their vessels getting through suggests Iran is willing to allow commercially neutral actors through the system, even absent a formal agreement.
The Reuters report on the OPEC+ meeting, published the same day, noted that shipping data on Sunday showed a tanker loaded with Iraqi crude passing through the strait following Iran's Saturday announcement — a direct real-world consequence of the exemption. Reuters cited a source close to the issue noting that it "remains to be seen" whether more vessels will follow, given the risk of IRGC factions acting independently of official clearance.
Iraq's Position in the Middle
The Iraq exemption is not purely altruistic on Iran's part. It is also a strategic necessity. Iraq's Ministry of Oil announced last month that production had fallen from 4.3 million barrels per day before the war to 1.2 million barrels per day — a collapse of more than 70 percent in output — amid declining crude export capacity caused by the Hormuz closure, according to Al Jazeera. Iraq depends on oil exports for the vast majority of its government revenue. A prolonged closure that strangled Iraqi production would have destabilized the Baghdad government in ways inconvenient for Tehran.
By exempting Iraq, Iran accomplishes multiple objectives at once: it maintains a critical economic lifeline for a government aligned with its interests, it demonstrates to other regional actors that alignment with Tehran has tangible benefits, and it inserts a wedge between Iraq and the United States by making the continuation of Iraqi oil revenues contingent on Iran's goodwill rather than US military pressure.
Pakistan and Egypt as Back-Channels
While Iran publicly rejects any negotiations with the United States, the behind-the-scenes diplomatic picture is more active than Tehran's official posture suggests. CNN reported Sunday, citing a Pakistani source, that Pakistan and Egypt are functioning as intermediaries, helping channel communications between US and Iranian officials. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mohammed Ishaq Dar spoke with Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Saturday. During that call, Dar "reiterated Pakistan's support for all efforts aimed at de-escalation," according to Pakistan's foreign ministry.
Egypt's Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty held separate calls on Sunday with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and with Araghchi, discussing proposals for regional de-escalation, according to the Egyptian foreign ministry.
Neither channel has produced anything publicly. Iran continues to state that there are no talks and no deal in progress. Iran's position, as stated by Iranian presidential spokesperson Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Tabatabaei, is that the strait can reopen only if transit revenues compensate Iran for war damages through what Iran describes as a "new legal regime." That is a precondition the United States has not accepted and has not signaled it would accept.
What 53 Transits Actually Means
The 53-transit weekly figure from Lloyd's List Intelligence is the most concrete measure available of how much Hormuz has actually opened. Before the war, the strait typically saw several hundred commercial transits per week. A reduction of more than 90 percent means that the effective closure is still catastrophic for global energy markets — OPEC+ voted Sunday to raise quotas by 206,000 barrels per day for May, a figure that energy consultancy Energy Aspects described as "academic" relative to the 12 to 15 million barrel per day supply disruption the war has caused.
But the trend line matters as much as the absolute number. Thirty-six transits one week, then 53 the next. That is a nearly 50 percent increase in a single week. If that trajectory continued — and there is no guarantee it will — the strait could see meaningful volumes resuming within weeks rather than months. The Guardian reported that Iranian approval of a transit does not guarantee vessel safety, because the IRGC does not act as a single organization, and rogue factions could still delay or seize vessels despite official clearance. The risk premium on Gulf cargoes in insurance markets remains substantial for this reason.
The Deadline Expiring Monday
All of this is happening against the backdrop of Trump's April 6 deadline at 8 p.m. Eastern Time, after which he has threatened to begin striking Iranian power plants and bridges. Trump also announced Sunday that he would hold a press conference with military officials at the White House Briefing Room at 1 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, before the deadline expires. The New York Times, citing Trump's own statements after the F-15E rescue, confirmed the press conference was scheduled for Monday afternoon.
Iran's dual-track behavior — selectively easing Hormuz access while publicly rejecting any deal — creates a diplomatic situation without a clean resolution. Trump cannot declare victory from 53 transits when pre-war levels were in the hundreds. Iran cannot claim Hormuz is open when traffic is still down more than 90 percent. The back-channel diplomacy through Pakistan and Egypt has produced no public outcome. And the deadline is hours away.
What happens Monday will determine whether the selective-access system Iran has built over five weeks becomes a template for a negotiated resolution, or whether the tollbooth gets bombed along with the power plants Trump has been promising to hit since March 21.