The Second Chokepoint: If Houthis Block Bab al-Mandeb, the World Has Nowhere Left to Ship

What Just Happened

On Saturday, March 28, 2026, the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen announced and carried out its first military operation in support of Iran since the war began. Brigadier-General Yahya Saree, the Houthis' military spokesman, announced on Sunday that the group had conducted a "second military operation" against Israel using cruise missiles and drones and said the Houthis would continue military operations until Israel "ceases its attacks and aggression," per The Guardian and Al Jazeera.

The Houthis' entry had been anticipated but not yet certain. Despite being part of what Iran calls the "axis of resistance," the Houthis operate with substantial independence — their religious doctrine does not adhere to Iran's supreme leader in the same way Hezbollah does, Al Jazeera's Tohid Asadi reported from Tehran.

The critical question now is not whether the Houthis can fire missiles at Israel — they demonstrated that capacity during the October 2023–2025 Gaza conflict. The question is whether they escalate from Israel strikes to blocking or attacking shipping through Bab al-Mandeb, the 30-kilometer-wide (18-mile) strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Iran Threat — On the Record

Iran has made the threat explicit. On approximately March 25, Iran's semiofficial Tasnim news agency quoted an unnamed Iranian military official as saying that Iran would target shipping in the Red Sea if the United States "attempts a ground operation... or if it seeks to impose costs on Iran through naval manoeuvres" in the Gulf region. The official said: "The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is among the most strategic straits in the world, and Iran has both the will and the capability to pose a fully credible threat against it," per AFP/RFI.

Former U.S. diplomat Nabeel Khoury, a former deputy chief of mission in Yemen, described for Al Jazeera what Houthi Bab al-Mandeb action would look like in practice: "All they have to do is fire at a couple of ships coming through, and that would lead to the arrest of all commercial shipping through the Red Sea. That would be a red line, and then you would see attacks against Yemen very quickly."

What Is Bab al-Mandeb?

Bab al-Mandeb — "Gate of Tears" in Arabic — is a narrow strait at the southern tip of the Red Sea, approximately 100 kilometers long and 30 kilometers wide, separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea, per AFP. It is the only direct maritime route from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and from there to the Suez Canal, the primary shipping corridor between Asia and Europe.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported that 12 percent of world oil shipments passed through Bab al-Mandeb in the first half of 2023, before Houthi attacks later that year disrupted the route, per RFI/AFP citing EIA data. The Suez Canal, which Bab al-Mandeb feeds, handles approximately 30 percent of the world's container traffic, per the World Economic Forum.

In 2023, approximately 26,000 ships transited through the Suez Canal, per Suez Canal Authority data cited by AFP. By 2025, following Houthi attacks during the Gaza war, that figure had fallen to 12,700 — a 51 percent reduction, per AFP.

The strait is one of the most militarized maritime zones on earth. The United States and France maintain major military bases in neighboring Djibouti. China opened its first overseas military base there in 2017, per AFP.

What the 2024 Disruption Already Cost the World

The Houthis have already demonstrated what partial closure of this corridor can do.

During the Gaza war beginning November 2023, the Houthis attacked more than 190 ships transiting the Red Sea corridor by October 2024, per the Atlas Institute for International Affairs citing House of Commons Library research. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported in June 2024 that the Houthi attacks caused a 90 percent decrease in container shipping through the Red Sea from December 2023 to February 2024. The DIA also reported that 29 energy and shipping companies across 65 countries were affected and forced to reroute, per Wikipedia's Red Sea crisis article.

The primary alternative for ships avoiding the Red Sea is the Cape of Good Hope route, circumnavigating the southern tip of Africa. This adds approximately 10–14 days to Europe-Asia voyages and dramatically increases fuel costs per transit. The ripple effects in 2024 included surging shipping insurance premiums, rising container freight rates, and supply chain delays affecting European manufacturing.

Critically: during 2024, Hormuz was still open. Ships could — and did — reroute oil via Bab al-Mandeb/Red Sea or via the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu to avoid the Suez-Red Sea corridor if needed. That safety valve no longer exists. With Hormuz near-shut since February 28, Saudi Arabia's Yanbu port exports have approximately tripled to a record high of roughly 4 million barrels per day as the primary alternative, per Rystad Energy data cited by AFP. If Bab al-Mandeb closes, that escape route closes with it.

The Double-Chokepoint Scenario

A simultaneous near-closure of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb would have no modern historical precedent.

Under current conditions (Hormuz near-shut at 90%), the Middle East's Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE — have been routing their remaining oil exports through Yanbu and across the Red Sea via Bab al-Mandeb. Saudi Yanbu exports have tripled to approximately 4 million barrels per day, per Rystad Energy estimates via AFP.

If Bab al-Mandeb were blocked:

— The Yanbu bypass route would close, eliminating Gulf states' primary oil export alternative.

— Ships currently carrying goods between Asia and Europe would face only the Cape of Good Hope route, adding 7,000–10,000 kilometers per voyage.

— The 12 percent of world oil shipments that normally use the Red Sea corridor (EIA) would have no efficient alternative passage.

Rico Luman, transport economist at ING bank, told AFP that Iran's Hormuz threat has already driven three to four more tankers per day to use Bab al-Mandeb — a "notable difference" that would disappear if the Houthis attack the strait. The economic analyst described this as the remaining fragile lifeline for Gulf energy exports.

The Houthis' Strategic Position

Nabeel Khoury, the former U.S. diplomat, told Al Jazeera that the Houthis' current missile attacks on Israel amount to "token participation, not full participation." He described their logic: "There are US troops on their way to the region. There's been talk that if there is no agreement, there might be a full-scale attack on Iran as has not been seen so far. So for all that, the Houthis are saying, 'We are still here, and if you're really going to go all-out against Iran, we will then jump in.' But at this point, they haven't yet jumped in."

Negar Mortazavi, a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera that the Houthis' entry is "no surprise," describing the Iran-led axis of resistance as having consistently acted in accordance with its stated intentions: "Every step has really been what they have telegraphed, what they have threatened even before the war when they went to their Gulf Cooperation Council neighbours and they warned that this [the war] is not going to be inside their borders and they are going to immediately turn it into a regional war."

The Houthis' decision to blockade or not blockade Bab al-Mandeb is also strategically self-limiting. A full blockade would almost certainly trigger direct U.S. and coalition military strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen — as Khoury noted. Houthi attacks on ships already prompted U.S. and UK airstrikes in Yemen throughout 2024. The Houthis weigh their leverage carefully.

What to Watch

Several specific indicators will determine whether the Bab al-Mandeb threat materializes:

Ground invasion decision: The Iranian official cited in Tasnim specifically conditioned the Bab al-Mandeb threat on a U.S. ground operation or naval coercion in the Gulf. The arrival of the USS Tripoli with 2,500 Marines has intensified ground invasion speculation. If the U.S. moves toward a ground operation, the Bab al-Mandeb threat becomes considerably more credible.

Houthi escalation ladder: The current Houthi strikes target Israel, not shipping. A shift to attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea — as they did during the 2023–2025 Gaza crisis — would represent a qualitative escalation. Khoury's "couple of ships" threshold applies: even one or two targeted ships could freeze the corridor.

Suez Canal traffic data: Real-time Suez Canal transit numbers from the Suez Canal Authority provide a leading indicator. Any sudden further drop from the current 12,700-ships-per-year pace would signal that the private shipping industry is already pricing in a Bab al-Mandeb threat before any formal blockade.