Iran Is Charging $2 Million Per Ship to Cross Hormuz

The Toll

Iran has begun charging commercial vessels transit fees of up to $2 million per voyage for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, according to reporting by Bloomberg. Payments are being sought on an ad hoc basis, effectively creating an informal toll on the waterway. Some vessels have made the payment, though Bloomberg noted the mechanism — including which currency is used — is not yet clear, and the fee is not being applied systematically. (Source: Bloomberg, published via gCaptain, March 2026.)

Lloyd's List, one of the world's oldest maritime publications, reported separately that at least one tanker is believed to have made a payment. The lack of transparency and uncertainty over which vessels might be targeted next is adding "a fresh layer of friction" to the shipping lane, according to Bloomberg's sources. (Source: DW, citing Lloyd's List, March 2026.)

Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to a request for comment from Bloomberg, citing state-imposed restrictions on telecommunications and internet access.

The GCC Secretary-General Jasem al-Budaiwi publicly accused Iran of imposing the fees on Thursday, citing it as a violation of international maritime law. Experts quoted by Al Jazeera agreed that such fees breach established norms of freedom of navigation. (Source: Al Jazeera, March 26, 2026.)

What Iran Is Saying

Iranian officials have given contradictory signals. Several Iranian officials denied the reports. However, lawmaker Alaeddin Boroujerdi claimed on Iranian state television that fees were being collected as part of what he described as a "new sovereign regime" in the strait, framing the move as covering "war costs." (Source: DW, March 2026, citing Iranian state TV.)

Separately, Iran's Revolutionary Guard-aligned news agency Fars reported that a lawmaker told its reporters that Iran was drafting legislation to formalize the toll. A draft bill had been prepared but not yet completed, and lawmakers were planning to finalize it within approximately one week so it could be put to parliament, according to CNBC's reporting on the Fars account. (Source: CNBC, March 26, 2026.)

Bloomberg's sources said Iran has also floated the idea of formalizing the charges as part of a broader post-war settlement — meaning the toll may become a structural demand in any peace negotiation, not just a wartime measure. (Source: Bloomberg via gCaptain, March 2026.)

Iran also notified the International Maritime Organization (IMO) this week that "non-hostile vessels" may now transit Hormuz with coordination from Tehran. Peter Sand, chief analyst at the Copenhagen-based shipping analytics firm Xeneta, told DW that Iran is currently approving between three and five transits per day under this framework. (Source: DW, March 2026.)

The Scale of the Stranding

More than 3,200 vessels are stranded as a result of the Hormuz closure, according to Peter Sand of Xeneta, cited by DW. The strait normally carries approximately one-fifth of the world's daily oil and LNG supply, as well as significant volumes of food, metals, and other commodities.

Only a trickle of vessels have successfully crossed the waterway since the war began. Bloomberg noted that most of the few vessels that have crossed appear to be Iranian-linked, or have taken a route close to Iran's coastline. India confirmed that it had managed to get four vessels carrying liquefied petroleum gas out through Hormuz — and publicly stated that international law guarantees freedom of navigation and that no entity can lawfully levy fees on the channel. (Source: Bloomberg via gCaptain, March 2026.)

The IMO told DW separately that it is working to establish what it described as a "provisional and urgent measure to facilitate the safe evacuation of merchant ships currently confined within the Gulf region," prioritizing the welfare of stranded seafarers before addressing broader shipping flows.

Who Is Paying — and Why

Lloyd's List reported that India, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia, and China are speaking directly with Iranian officials to arrange safe passage for their ships. These are among the world's most energy-import-dependent countries. For them, paying a $2 million fee per vessel may be economically rational given the alternative: continued supply disruption, sustained triple-digit oil prices, and the industrial and political consequences of prolonged energy shortfalls.

Sand of Xeneta put it plainly to DW: "Some countries may want to pay. It is a small final premium to pay to ensure some sort of uninterrupted energy supply." He also noted the fee's limits as a solution: "What matters is that it's still unsafe to pass through [Hormuz]," making the transit charge secondary to the fundamental security risk. (Source: DW, citing Peter Sand, Xeneta, March 2026.)

Karen Young, senior research scholar at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, told CNBC it was "very clear" Iran would not be able to operate a toll booth in the strait long-term. She said: "That's something that the GCC states [including the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman] are not going to accept and not going to tolerate." She added that "any kind of side bargains or bilateral bargains with Iran in terms of their transit abilities, I think at the longer term, is just not tenable or acceptable to the rest of the exporters in the region." (Source: CNBC, March 26, 2026.)

The Legal Question

The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, ships of all nations have the right of transit passage through international straits — a navigational right that cannot be suspended or conditioned by the bordering state. Charging a fee for passage is not a recognized right under UNCLOS or customary international maritime law.

Robert Huebert, an international relations expert at the University of Calgary, told the Energi Media podcast: "Freedom of navigation … is the foundation of international maritime trade … the ability to go through these areas without any form of obstruction. If you were to do that [charge a fee], you would have direct opposition from almost every state." (Source: DW, citing Robert Huebert, University of Calgary, March 2026.)

Iran's counter-argument — which it has made publicly and in communications to the IMO — is that its closure of Hormuz is a legitimate act of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, given the ongoing US-Israeli military campaign against it. Whether that self-defense right extends to charging transit fees is legally novel and unresolved. Iran's ceasefire demands, as reported in Iranian state media, include US recognition of Iranian "control" over the Strait of Hormuz — a demand that, if accepted, would establish a legal precedent far beyond the current fee dispute.

The Sanctions Problem

Iran remains subject to extensive international sanctions, which severely restrict its ability to receive US dollar-denominated payments through Western financial institutions. Lloyd's List reported it was unclear how the $2 million transactions were being executed given these constraints. Bloomberg's reporting did not clarify the currency. This opacity is deliberate — the payments are being handled quietly, according to Bloomberg's sources, precisely because the parties involved would face scrutiny from Western regulators for doing business with a sanctioned entity. (Source: DW, citing Lloyd's List; Bloomberg via gCaptain, March 2026.)

The sanctions paradox is significant: the countries most likely to pay — India, China, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia — are also the countries most able to transact outside the dollar-clearing system. India has extensive experience routing payments through alternative channels following its purchases of sanctioned Russian oil since 2022. China's financial architecture is partly designed to route around Western sanctions infrastructure.

Why It Matters

The Hormuz toll, informal as it currently is, represents something new in maritime history: a country at war with major powers unilaterally imposing fees on one of the world's most important shipping chokepoints, with some buyers quietly paying rather than challenging it.

The precedent implications extend well beyond this war. If Iran successfully normalizes — even informally — the idea that a bordering state can charge passage fees through an international strait, it potentially provides a template for other chokepoint-adjacent states to assert similar claims. The Strait of Malacca (between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia), the Bab-el-Mandeb (Yemen/Djibouti), and the Taiwan Strait are all international straits where similar logic could theoretically be applied in future conflicts.

At the same time, Sand's observation cuts to the practical reality: the fee is not reopening Hormuz. At three to five transits per day against a pre-war baseline of dozens of tankers daily, the strait remains functionally closed. The $2 million is not a solution to the crisis — it is a revenue stream from the crisis.