Early on the morning of April 2, 2026 — Day 34 of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran — the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad published a security alert in stark, unambiguous language: "Iraqi terrorist militia groups aligned with Iran may intend to conduct attacks in central Baghdad in the next 24-48 hours." The alert listed potential targets — U.S. citizens, businesses, universities, diplomatic facilities, energy infrastructure, hotels, and airports. It warned that militia fighters "may carry identification denoting their status as Iraqi government employees." And it told every American still in Iraq to leave immediately, noting that airspace is closed and the only options are overland routes to Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey.
The April 2 alert is the sharpest in a series the Embassy has issued since the Iran war began on February 28, and it reflects a deteriorating situation that has received significantly less coverage than the main strikes on Iranian territory. While the world watches missile salvos above Tehran and ceasefire negotiations that haven't happened, Iraq has quietly become an active second front — one where Iran's proxy network has been attacking U.S. interests for over a month, the U.S. has been striking back with lethal force, and an American journalist was kidnapped by a militia group just two days ago.
What the Embassy Alert Actually Says
The official security alert, published April 2 on the U.S. Embassy Baghdad website and cited by Al Arabiya and The National, uses language that goes beyond boilerplate travel warnings. It states directly: "Iran and Iran-aligned terrorist militias have conducted widespread attacks against U.S. citizens and targets associated with the United States throughout Iraq, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). They may intend to target U.S. citizens, businesses, universities, diplomatic facilities, energy infrastructure, hotels, airports, and other locations perceived to be associated with the United States, as well as Iraqi institutions and civilian targets. Terrorist militias have targeted Americans for kidnapping. U.S. citizens should leave Iraq now."
The embassy added that it "remains open while on ordered departure" — meaning non-emergency staff have already been evacuated — but advised citizens not to approach the Baghdad embassy or the Erbil consulate "in light of significant security risks." The Level 4: Do Not Travel advisory for Iraq — the highest warning level issued by the State Department — has been in effect throughout the conflict.
The departure instructions themselves illustrate the severity: Iraq's airspace is closed. Commercial flights are not operating out of the country. Americans are directed to leave via overland routes, with the Embassy noting travelers "should expect long delays." Royal Jordanian Airlines, according to the alert, has established a ground transport service running from Baghdad to Amman's Queen Alia International Airport, following an arrangement put in place on March 30. The Embassy flagged that flights out of neighboring countries "may also be closed," and prices for available flights "may be much higher than normal, as well as overbooked, delayed, or cancelled on short notice."
A Month of Escalation: The Iraqi Theater
To understand why the Embassy issued this alert, the record of the past 34 days in Iraq is essential context. The following timeline is drawn from Wikipedia's "Iraq in the 2026 Iran war" entry, which aggregates sourced reports from Reuters, Al Jazeera, the Jerusalem Post, and other outlets:
March 10: A drone attack targeted the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center — a logistics hub for U.S. diplomats near Baghdad International Airport. Six drones were launched; five were intercepted, one struck near a guard tower. No casualties were reported. U.S. officials attributed the attack to Iran-backed militias, according to the Wikipedia entry citing sourced reports.
March 11: Saraya Awliya al-Dam, a pro-Iran Iraqi militia and component of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), claimed responsibility for four "special operations" targeting U.S. bases inside and outside Iraq in the preceding 24 hours.
March 14: A missile struck a helipad at the U.S. Embassy complex in Baghdad's Green Zone, causing visible smoke above the compound. No casualties were publicly reported.
March 14-15: Iraq's Justice Ministry warned that U.S. strikes near Baghdad International Airport were threatening the security of al-Karkh Central Prison, which held thousands of ISIS detainees recently transferred from Syria. The five missiles that struck the airport caused injuries to four people.
March 16: Multiple explosions struck Baghdad's Jadriyah district, killing at least four people in what was described as an air raid on a house used by an Iran-backed group.
March 17: A drone attack targeted the Al Rasheed Hotel in the Green Zone. Separately, a militia released footage showing a fiber-optic drone performing reconnaissance above the U.S. Embassy compound.
March 18: A drone struck the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad directly.
March 23-24: U.S./Israeli airstrikes hit a regional headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — Iraq's umbrella group of Iran-backed Shi'ite militias — killing at least 15 fighters, according to Reuters. Among those killed was Saad Dawai, the PMF's Anbar operations commander, along with 14 other fighters at his headquarters.
March 28: Double-tap strikes against PMF and Iraqi police personnel near Baghdad killed at least five, according to The National.
March 31: U.S. freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson was kidnapped in Baghdad. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed in its March 31 Special Report that Kataib Hezbollah "almost certainly executed the kidnapping." ISW noted the U.S. government had reportedly warned Kittleson beforehand. U.S. State Department spokesman Dylan Johnson confirmed a suspect had been arrested and had ties to Kataib Hezbollah, according to The National.
April 1: Three PMF fighters were killed in an attack on the outskirts of Mosul. The PMF blamed the U.S. and Israel.
The aggregate toll as reported by The National on April 2: more than 100 PMF fighters killed and approximately 300 injured since the outbreak of the conflict on February 28.
The PMF and Why Iraq Is Different
The Popular Mobilization Forces are not a fringe group. They are a legally recognized component of the Iraqi state security apparatus, established by government decree in 2014 to combat ISIS. Their leadership and major factions, however, are deeply embedded with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and several component groups — including Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Al Nujaba Movement, and Kataib Sayied al-Shuhda — have long-standing operational ties to Tehran, according to The National's March 27 explainer on Iranian proxies in Iraq.
This creates an institutional ambiguity that the U.S. Embassy's April 2 alert addressed directly: "Iran-aligned terrorist militia groups may claim to be associated with the Iraqi government. Terrorists may carry identification denoting their status as Iraqi government employees." The warning is not merely about non-state actors — it is a signal that the boundary between state actors and Iran-aligned militias in Iraq is, in practice, difficult or impossible to verify in real time.
The Iraqi government's own position has been uncomfortable throughout. Baghdad has formally protested U.S. strikes on Iraqi territory and summoned the U.S. charge d'affaires and Iranian envoy following the March strikes, according to Reuters. At the same time, the Iraqi government has not moved to expel U.S. forces or sever ties with Washington. The U.S. Embassy's April 2 alert stated plainly: "The Iraqi government has not prevented terrorist attacks in or from Iraqi territory" — a pointed diplomatic assessment embedded in what is nominally a public safety notice.
The Broader Context: Iran's Proxy Network Under Pressure
Iran's strategy in Iraq reflects a pattern visible across its regional proxy network: using allied non-state actors to absorb and distribute military pressure, while maintaining deniability and preserving Iran's own formal military assets for direct action. In Iraq, that strategy has produced a month of drone and missile attacks on U.S. facilities — some intercepted, some not — combined with an intelligence-driven kidnapping of an American journalist and ongoing reconnaissance of U.S. diplomatic sites.
The U.S. response — striking PMF command facilities, killing senior PMF commanders, conducting what the PMF described as "treacherous American targeting" — escalates the cycle. Each U.S. strike generates a stated rationale for retaliation by the militias; each militia attack gives the U.S. cause to strike again. The April 2 imminent-attack alert suggests U.S. intelligence has assessed a retaliatory attack is now imminent — though the alert does not specify the intelligence basis for the 24-48 hour timeline.
For Americans still in Iraq — aid workers, journalists, contractors, dual nationals — the departure options are constrained in ways that recall the final days of major U.S. drawdowns from conflict zones. Airspace closed. Ground routes open but potentially dangerous. Overbooked flights on the other side of the border. The Embassy's guidance to go to Jordan specifically references a ground transport arrangement that was put in place just days ago.
Iraq is not a sideshow to the Iran war. It is a front. And the U.S. Embassy's April 2 alert is the clearest signal yet that the situation there is trending toward a scenario the embassy does not control.