What Happened Before the War: Witkoff's Iran Talks, the Geneva Offer, and Why They Failed
At Trump's first Cabinet meeting since the war began, envoy Steve Witkoff publicly detailed pre-war US demands for the first time — and Iran's response. The Guardian's investigation reveals the full picture: a chaotic negotiating process, a written Iranian offer that was never published, and a war that diplomats say didn't have to happen.
What Witkoff Said at the Cabinet Meeting
Speaking from prepared remarks at the White House on Thursday, March 26 — Trump's first Cabinet meeting since the war began — Special Envoy Steve Witkoff publicly described the pre-war US demands for the first time. The demands he listed, made to the Iranian government during negotiations, included:
- "No chance" on weaponizing Iran's nuclear program
- The decommissioning of the Fordow nuclear facility, which the US had bombed in the prior June conflict ("Midnight Hammer")
- "No enrichment whatsoever"
- A ban on stockpiling nuclear material
- Turning over enriched uranium to the United States
- A cutback in Iran's ballistic missile inventory and range capability
(Source: ABC News, March 26, 2026, reporting from the Cabinet meeting.)
Witkoff described Iran's response: the Iranians argued they had an "inalienable right to enrich," and said they "would not give up diplomatically what the US could not win militarily." (Source: ABC News, March 26, 2026.)
Witkoff then addressed Trump directly: "These are incontrovertible signs among many other signs that their regime had not given their negotiating team authority to make a deal required by you." He continued: "Throughout all of these negotiations, we were repeatedly rebuffed on everything we asked for. I have no doubt that we exhausted all efforts on behalf of a peaceful resolution as you directed." (Source: ABC News, March 26, 2026.)
Witkoff also said he believed Iran was now looking for an "off-ramp," citing Trump's willingness to listen to peace proposals as "well received." He closed his remarks by warning: "We have told Iran one last thing: don't miscalculate again." (Source: ABC News, March 26, 2026.)
On the current negotiations, Witkoff confirmed to Reuters: "We will see where things lead, and if we can convince Iran that this is the inflection point with no good alternatives for them other than more death and destruction. We have strong signs that this is a possibility." (Source: Reuters, March 26, 2026.)
How the Pre-War Talks Actually Unfolded
The Guardian published a detailed reconstruction of the negotiations on March 18, 2026, based on sources with direct knowledge of the talks — including Gulf diplomats and individuals present at the sessions. Note: Some specific claims in the Guardian's account — including whether UK national security adviser Jonathan Powell attended the final Geneva session — have been disputed by The Telegraph and by US/European officials cited by other outlets. The Witkoff behavior and structural failures described below draw on the Guardian but readers should be aware the account is contested in some particulars. The picture that emerges is substantially different from Witkoff's characterization of "exhausting all efforts."
According to the Guardian, Witkoff rarely took notes during the five sessions of the first round of talks last year. He brought only Michael Anton — described as "a hawkish essayist and political philosopher with no specialism in the Iran nuclear file" — to the negotiations. A technical team was supposed to be available remotely in Washington but was not consistently integrated into the talks. (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
In one incident, when talks resumed in Oman on February 6, Witkoff arrived in Muscat with Admiral Brad Cooper, the commander of US forces in the Middle East, in full naval uniform. Cooper was politely asked to leave the talks by the Omani hosts. Witkoff's explanation was that Cooper "just happened to be in the neighbourhood." (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
In an earlier incident, Witkoff invited Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to tour the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group — the same carrier deployed to the Gulf in preparation for the strikes. The Guardian described the invitation as "idiosyncratic at best." Araghchi did not accept. (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
One Gulf diplomat with direct knowledge of the talks told the Guardian that Witkoff and Kushner were "Israeli assets that had conspired to force the US president into entering a war from which he is now desperate to get himself out of." The Guardian noted that Witkoff, by his own admission, acknowledged his knowledge of Iran's nuclear programme was "sketchy" but said he "was competent to discuss it since he had studied it." (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
The Arms Control Association published analysis in March 2026 noting that in one instance, Witkoff's technical assessment of why Iran did not need the fuel it was retaining appeared to misunderstand the purpose of the Tehran Research Reactor. Witkoff alleged the uranium was being "stockpiled" based on his conclusion that Iran had an "overabundance" of reactor fuel — a technical claim that specialists disputed. (Source: Arms Control Association, March 11, 2026.)
The Geneva Offer Iran Never Published
The final round of pre-war talks took place in Geneva on February 26 — two days before the strikes began on February 28. Iran presented a written seven-page offer for a new deal at those talks, including an annex. The offer was shown to Witkoff during the session. Iran has never published this document publicly, despite calls from within Iran to do so. (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
The Guardian reported that Jonathan Powell, the UK national security adviser, was present at the Geneva talks and judged Iran's offer significant enough to prevent a "rush to war." However, The Telegraph reported on March 19, 2026 that Powell was not in the room during the final meeting, citing White House and European officials who denied the account. Whether Powell attended remains disputed between the two outlets. What is not disputed: Iran presented a written offer on February 26, and the war began two days later. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi publicly stated he hoped "the truth of what happened on the final day of talks, 26 February, would soon become known." (Sources: The Guardian, March 18, 2026; The Telegraph, March 19, 2026.)
Witkoff, for his part, said the Iranians were being "deceptive," "full of subterfuge" and "smelled fishy." The Guardian noted that one Gulf diplomat said: "Greater time and expertise would not have guaranteed an agreement, but it would have helped. What I will say is that in all the explanations of what went on, it is the Iranians that have normally been telling the truth." (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
Witkoff also compressed the time available for the Iranian sessions. On February 17, he held talks with Ukraine in the same day, leaving just three and a half hours for the Iranian negotiators. Since the talks were being conducted indirectly at Iran's request, these exchanges were described as "frustratingly short." (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
Iran's Own Responsibility
The Guardian's account does not absolve Iran. The investigation notes that Iran never published its seven-page Geneva offer despite pressure to do so — which limits any independent assessment of how serious it was. Iran's negotiators repeatedly told US counterparts they had the "inalienable right to enrich" — a position that was fundamentally incompatible with the US demand for zero enrichment. And Iran's belief, stated to Witkoff, that it "would not give up diplomatically what the US could not win militarily" — a phrase Witkoff quoted publicly at the Cabinet meeting — reflects a calculation about US resolve that turned out to be wrong. (Sources: ABC News; The Guardian.)
The Guardian also noted that questions remain about whether calls inside Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon will grow after the war. The new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei's first public statement made no reference to whether the religious fatwa banning the use of nuclear weapons — set by his late father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — remained in place. (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
The Context: A Decade of Failed Nuclear Diplomacy
The 2026 pre-war talks were not the first to collapse. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — negotiated by the Obama administration, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China — capped Iran's enrichment and reduced its uranium stockpile in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. Iran subsequently began rebuilding its nuclear program.
The US and Israel conducted a 12-day air campaign against Iran's nuclear facilities in June 2025 — referred to by Witkoff as "Midnight Hammer." Fordow, the deeply buried enrichment facility, was struck at that time. Despite the strike, Iran continued enrichment activities at other facilities. The February 2026 talks that preceded the current war were, in part, an attempt to convert the military pressure from that June strike into a diplomatic agreement. They failed. (Sources: ABC News; Wikipedia 2025-2026 Iran–United States negotiations article.)
The Obama-era comparison is instructive. When the Obama administration sent a team to nuclear talks in Vienna in 2009, it dispatched 10 senior officials from four different departments. Talks stretched over three 24-hour days, with negotiators in constant contact with Washington. The 2026 talks involved Witkoff, Kushner, and a mostly absent Washington support team. (Source: The Guardian, March 18, 2026.)
Where Things Stand Now
Today's Cabinet speech represents the first time the US government has publicly detailed the substance of pre-war demands. The timing is significant: it comes on Day 27 of the war, as the 15-point peace proposal has been transmitted to Iran via Pakistan, and as Iran is reportedly considering its response through back channels.
Witkoff's characterization — that Iran is "seeking an off-ramp" and that there are "strong signs" a deal is possible — contrasts with Iran's public position, which has included demands for war reparations, recognition of Iranian control over Hormuz, and guarantees against future attacks. Whether the private signals differ from the public statements is precisely the question the Pakistan intermediary channel is designed to resolve.
What is documented: the pre-war negotiations happened, included specific demands on both sides, ended with Iran saying it would not give up diplomatically what the US could not win militarily, and were followed two days later by the largest US-Israeli military operation against Iran in history. Four weeks later, the war is ongoing and the same envoys are trying again.